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The analysis will focus on how the traditional Kindlebergian financial-crisis cycle of “manias, panics 
and crashes” has been twisted so that now policymakers make sure that any panic is immediately 
followed by a renewed mania.  Due to a “secular-stagnationists”-style thinking, central bankers, 
treasury officials and politicians ―the ‘new alchemists’― now believe that only a perpetual-mania 
can deliver some resemblance of growth.  So, they persist in pumping liquidity and relaxing monetary 
conditions, no matter how much this violates every possible principle of markets economics, and 
regardless of the fact that the current policies to reactivate mature economies (rocketing the net-
worth of a few individuals) have already been tried and failed post-2008.  One by-product of this new 
perpetual-mania is that emerging markets have become what I have labelled “the financial markets 
of last resort”, and commodities “the financial asset of last resort”.  That is, most emerging markets 
now don’t have to put up anymore with international finance being a “sellers” market (where they 
had to knock and beg); now, it is the international speculator who has been pushed into a yield-
chasing frenzy in emerging markets.  This new “buyers” market has proved to be a mixed blessing for 
emerging markets, as many of them have joined the ‘everything rally’ ―in which you have nothing to 
lose but your real economy.   
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The last thing we need to reactivate our economies  
are more “silly billys” [silly billionaires] 
Financial Time’s Columnist  
  
In my darkest moments I have begun to wonder  
if the monetary accommodation  
we have already engineered might … 
 be working in the wrong places  
[in emerging markets rather than in the US]. 
President of the Dallas’ FED  
 
 Liberalised finance tends to metastasise, like a cancer. 
Martin Wolf 
 
We welcome illusions  
because they spare us unpleasurable feelings,  
and enable us to enjoy satisfactions instead.  
We must not complain, then, if now and again  
they come into collision with some portion of reality,  
and are shattered against it. 
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1  As I am writing on insubstantial asset-price inflation, I have to declare an interest: since 
graduating, I have always owned a comfortable house or a flat, and I have made more 
money via (tax-free) capital gains on them than throughout my long working life.  The 
phrase “perpetual orgy” is borrowed from Mario Vargas Llosa’s book of the same name, as 
well as from Sodré (2015).  When writing this paper I had a health scare, but with Ignês, 
and as always, (borrowing from Neruda) “una palabra entonces, una sonrisa bastan.”  
(Just one word, one smile are enough).  
2  http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/people/emeritus/jgp5  
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Introduction  
When I was finishing writing this, one individual made US$30 billion (bn) 
in a single day, and another (a shareholder of a tiny automaker) US$13bn, lifting 
his gains to US$88bn since the pandemic outbreak (so now he is promising to 
build a city next, on Mars!3  In turn, one asset manager made US$16bn from a 
single bet, while a quintet of tech-giants, after loosing US$1.3 trillion (tn) in 
March, reached US$7tn in August ―more than the entire Japanese Topix (2,170 
companies).   
In the case of Apple (whose best days were meant to be behind due to a 
lack of product diversification and concerns about its position in China), a whole 
trillion was added to its market valuation in just 21 trading days.  As a new breed 
of policy makers have run out of ideas, and a bunch of over-liquid speculators 
can’t think of where else to park their money, reality became stranger than 
fiction.  
I am sure all this makes complete sense for those involved, and for neo-
liberal zealots and the lobby of many powerful especial interest groups, but this 
frenzy not only has a crushing effect on the real economy (and almost everything 
else for that matter), but it is also the outcome of a toxic cocktail of intrinsic 
market failures in finance, mixed with new huge market distortions.  Among the 
latter, the belief of monetary authorities that the best way to keep calm in 
financial markets and to reactivate mature economies is by rocketing the net-
worth of a few individuals, and the rapidly growing ownership-concentration in 
financial asset stand out ―the 10 largest institutional investors now collectively 
own more than a quarter of the US stock market (and some have been                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
rather shrewd at profiting from this overwhelming market power both in terms of 
financial gains, and of capturing policy).  
In turn, Asia’s 20 wealthiest clans are now worth more than half a trillion 
dollars; and although in this region the real economy still matters, it has not 
been immune to this ‘dance of the billions’ (well, by now trillions): just one Asian 
asset manager made such derivative bets that his “Nasdaq whale” threatened to 
transform a “melt-up” in tech stocks into an avalanche.  And, according to an 
insider, “the whale is still hungry”.4  No wonder that Lamborghini has just 
registered the best month in its history, with a global sales record.  Pandemic, 
what pandemic?  Real economy collapse, what collapse?   
After the dot.com debacle the Nasdaq had taken 16 years to return to its 
previous peak; now in 2020 (after its one-third collapse in February) this took 
two and a half months ―only to continue its ascend towards an overall jump of 
75%.  As this level was out of range of every metric, and as the pandemic was 
becoming endemic, the conditions for a new dive are already there ―just months 
after the previous one.  Warren Buffett is surely right: “When you combine 
leverage with ignorance, you get some pretty interesting results”.   
Indeed, as the Financial Times (FT) Senior Investment Commentator said 
in the midst of the mayhem, “Notions that markets are perfectly efficient and 
move seamlessly to incorporate every new piece of information … now seem 
embarrassing”.5  
                                           
3  The capitalisation of this automaker jumped 10 times in a year, reaching at one point 
US$400bn, an amount higher than Toyota and Volkswagen combined, and exceeding 
Walmart’s.  Tesla has also become “a faith-based stock” among armchair amateur 
speculators enjoying online trading during pandemic lockdowns.  
4  https://www.ft.com/content/75587aa6-1f1f-4e9d-b334-3ff866753fa2 
5  https://www.ft.com/content/b1b44de0-1283-11e8-940e-08320fc2a277   
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No wonder Kindleberger called these euphorias “manias” in the 
psychoanalytic sense.  And this are made much worse when central bankers and 
governments have been deluded into believing, as the main character of Paulo 
Coelho’s popular novel The Alchemist, that "when you really want something to 
happen, …your wish comes true".   
The fact that the current policies to reactivate mature economies 
(rocketing the net-worth of a few individuals) have already been tried and failed 
post-2008, have not stopped the ‘new alchemists’ from trying them all over again 
in 2020.  As Einstein once said, “Insanity is doing the same thing over and over 
again and expecting different results”.  Indeed, (according to Moody) in the UK 
less than 1% of the resources generated by new corporate bonds after ‘QE’ 
(quantitative easing) were used to create new productive capacities.6  Even 
according to the IMF, almost anything else is better for growth than more of the 
same QE-led financial pyrotechnics; this is particularly true of some standard 
Keynesian policies.  For example, for the IMF Deputy Director of Fiscal Affairs 
“You get a bigger bang for your buck from public investment because [the impact 
of current policies on] investment by private firms is extremely low”.7  
In fact, the ‘new alchemists’ ―now the “financial dealers of last resort”― 
are currently trying to pull a hat trick: to calm down financial markets after the 
outbreak of the pandemic by diving in with extraordinary liquidity support, 
including the FED buying junk bonds at ‘triple A’ prices; to reactivate the 
economies by making sure that the net-worth of a few individuals went into outer 
space; and to convince everybody that their post-modern growth theory is right: 
the more shameless QE becomes as an exchange of cash for trash, the faster the 
reactivation.  Wishful-thinking has surely become delusional.  
According to an insider ―as events only scream “bubble!"― all that the 
‘new alchemists’ have really achieved “is a return to the world of dot.com[edy]”.8   
Baron Rothschild is supposed to have said before a previous crash: “there 
seems to be a lot of stupid money in the hands of a lot of stupid people”.  
Whether true or not, it surely applies now!  Paraphrasing Oscar Wilde, thanks to 
the ‘new alchemists’, anyone who wants to make money doing something socially 
useful must suffer from a lack of imagination.   
The analysis will focus on how the traditional Kindlebergian financial-crisis 
cycle of “manias, panics and crashes” has been twisted so that any panic is now 
followed by a renewed mania.  Due to “secular-stagnationists”-style ideas, 
central bankers, treasury officials and politicians now believe that only a 
perpetual-mania can deliver some resemblance of growth;9 so, they keep 
pumping liquidity and relaxing monetary conditions ―no matter how much this 
violate every possible principle of markets economics.  As Summers stated,  
                                           
6  http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b09pl66b#play 
7  Quoted in https://www.ft.com/content/fc7ad858-0fdd-401e-bce5-796a8353ba30.  For 
the IMF report in question, 
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/FM/Issues/2020/09/30/october-2020-fiscal-monitor 
8  https://www.ft.com/content/c97e428e-2457-4b6a-bb8e-01477c418beb.  Yet, in the 
dot.com bubble there was at least a massive investment boom in the new technology (see 
Pérez, 2002).  
9  “Secular stagnation” states that when the (unobservable) ‘natural’ rate of interest 
becomes negative, slow growth is due to chronically weak demand (relative to potential 
output).  
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If [tax cuts fuelled] budget deficits had …not grown relative to the economy …[and 
if] an extra $10tn in wealth had not been created by abnormal stock market 
returns, it is hard to believe that the US economy would be growing much at all.10  
Therefore,  
Most of what [could] be done under the aegis of preventing a future [financial] 
crisis would be counterproductive.11   
Unfortunately, Summers forgot to explain how his current idealisation of 
‘abnormal’ financial returns squares with his traditional “efficient capital markets” 
beliefs ―as for him, “… [asset] prices will always reflect fundamental values […].  
The logic of efficient markets is compelling”.12  
Of all people, Krugman agrees:  
[Today] even improved financial regulation is not necessarily a good thing… it may 
discourage irresponsible lending and borrowing at a time when more spending of 
any kind is good for the economy.13   
In short, for growth to take place, the law of gravity supposedly needs to stop 
working in finance so that a perpetual-mania can be engineered, transforming 
panics into mere inconvenient hangovers. 
For Tobin (1978), instead, rather than lubricants on the wheels of finance, 
what growth needs is sand thrown on them.14  Indeed, for Keynesian, 
governments should exercise different forms of agency aiming at ‘disciplining’ the 
capitalist élite into spending productively.  And the “whatever it takes” should be 
applied to the stopping of the mania from taking place in the first place!   
A by-product of this perpetual-mania is that emerging markets have 
become what I have labelled “the financial markets of last resort”, and 
commodities “the financial asset of last resort”.  That is, now most emerging 
markets don’t have to put up anymore with international finance being a “sellers” 
market, where they had to knock and beg; now it is the international speculator 
who has been pushed into a yield-chasing frenzy in emerging markets. 
Also, due to the shortages of minimally solid financial assets in which to 
park excess liquidity, speculators now seek refuge in commodities ―leading to 
artificial price-bonanzas, such as the “super-cycle”.   
I shall look first at the financial upheavals of January and February 2018 
as they show the shape of things to come, with events in 2020 resembling those 
in early 2018.  In January of that year, the S&P jumped by 8% entirely on hype 
(see below), only for this mania to be stopped by a “Minsky-moment” (first 
Monday of February), leading to a generalised panic and to a more than 10% fall 
in share prices in just nine trading days.  But then came the unexpected (well, by 
now pretty much the “expected”): even though what had just happened was the 
biggest ever recorded sudden change from exuberance to agony over a period of 
two weeks since records began more than a century ago, despite the S&P 
recording its biggest ever absolute fall (and so on), that early February panic, 
instead of threatening to become a crash, was immediately followed by a 
renewed-mania ―and the S&P 500 jumped by 8% in the following days.  
                                           
10  https://www.ft.com/content/aa76e2a8-4ef2-11e8-9471-a083af05aea7 (emphasis 
added). 
11  Ibid.  See also Łukasz and Summers (2019).  
12  https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF00122806    
13 https://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/11/16/secular-stagnation-coalmines-bubbles-
and-larry-summers/ 
14  https://www.ft.com/content/6210e49c-9307-11de-b146-00144feabdc0 
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As long as market makers can count on the moral hazard that no matter 
how much risk they take, they will not have to suffer its potential consequences 
because the new alchemists will always keep refilling the punch bowl, we are 
bound to have the perfect conditions for a perpetual-mania.  Inevitably, there will 
periods of panic, but they will become just mere short-breaks from excessive 
partying.   
So, we have reached the bizarre situation in which for speculators who are 
able to remain calm ―and solvent― in the face of volatility, a financial panic is 
just an excellent opportunity for restructuring portfolios, acquiring assets that 
might have been lost opportunities in the past. 
That is, financial markets now have the power to “stop, rewind, and 
erase” and be ready to follow the new mania marching orders coming from a 
cheering FED and an encouraging Treasury.  Thus, what happened in early 2018 
was the start of a new trend ―as what has happened so far in 2020 has a feeling 
of déjà vu.  
This new type of financial ‘markets’ has impacted emerging markets in 
several ways.  As excess liquidity lowers yields in advanced countries ―to the 
point of creating about US$ 15tn of government and corporate bonds with 
negative yields―15 higher-yields emerging markets have become “the financial 
market of last resort”.  And as they have been flooded with cheap finance, their 
financial stability is at risk because their big agents are always prone to acquire 
more financial risks than is privately ―let alone socially― efficient.  Therefore, 
what is likely to follow is a highly damaging dynamic of unsustainable finance.  
Also, as emerging markets are now essential for international finance, 
their powerful lobby wants more protection such as the reinforcement of the 
structure of property rights.  Thus, in new “trade” agreements ―e.g., the 
Transpacific Partnership Treaty (or, TPP)― the trade component is just the bait 
as its core is a Buchanan-inspired new type of absolute corporate protection, 
which includes a new Gracía-Márquean concept of “indirect expropriation”: if any 
regulatory or policy change affects profits, no matter how rational, efficient or 
necessary they may be, corporations will have the right of compensation.16   
Also, as international finance is now a “buyers” market for emerging 
economies, I shall also argue (following Kindleberger, 2005; Stiglitz and Wise, 
1981; and what I have previously discussed in Palma, 2009, 2012. and 2016) 
that this type of market is a mixed blessing.  Abundance can easily have a highly 
destabilising effect in economies without sturdy capital controls and effective 
financial regulation because highly liquid and moral hazard-distorted international 
financial markets lack the capacity to implement the required intelligent “credit 
rationing” that de-regulated emerging markets need more than most for a 
sustainable efficient finance.17  Also, issues such as adverse selection under these 
circumstances are particularly relevant.18  
                                           
15  Germany’s negative yielding government bonds exceed the value of all the euro notes 
in circulation. 
16  https://www.ciperchile.cl/2019/03/26/el-tpp-11-y-sus-siete-mentiras-de-democracia-
protegida-a-corporaciones-protegidas/.  For Buchanan (1993), those who really need 
"social protection" are big corporations.  He saw society as in an eternal conflict between 
"creators" (entrepreneurs) and "kidnappers" (everyone else), who as “parasites" or 
"predators" would constantly have the former besieged.  So, the property rights of 
“innovators” have to be solidly protected.  The TPP is really about this; the rest is just the 
wrapping paper.  
17  The best known aspect of “credit rationing” is the limiting by lenders of the supply of 
additional credit to borrowers who demand funds, even if the latter are willing to pay 
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The key point here is that in emerging markets, plagued with market 
failures and distortions in finance, the financial price mechanism fails even more 
than in advanced markets as far as being able to bring about a system of 
sustainable efficient finance in an environment of easy access to almost unlimited 
cheap finance.19   
Just one example of the impact on emerging markets of this bull market 
insanity is the Argentinean 100-year bond: shortly before the February 2018 
debacle, Argentina (still a junk-rated country) issued a pioneering 100-year bond, 
part of President Macri's US$200bn debt binge.  And ‘investors’ gobbled it up 
(Thomson Reuters reported orders equivalent to three times its value);20 thus 
conveniently forgetting they were lending for 100 years to a serial defaulter that 
was using these funds mostly to subsidise capital flight.  Just two years later 
(surprise, surprise), the implied probability of default on this bond was 85%.21  
And Argentina was not alone in seducing amnesic speculators frantically chasing 
any financial asset that might produce a return in the short-term.   
One way to understand current market-distorting policies ―such as ‘QE’, 
extreme monetary relaxation and rescue-packages lacking conditionality― is as 
an unsurprising progression of the financial reforms carried out since Reagan and 
Thatcher.  Their real impact has been transparent: if the United States had the 
same level of wealth as it has today, but wealth inequality was the same that 
existed when Reagan was elected, the richest 1% would possess only half of their 
wealth; the top 0.1% only a third; and the top 0.01% just a fifth of what it has 
now.22   
This is the fundamental problem with the current neo-liberal model: there 
are not many ways to reshape its structure (so that it can move ‘forward’) as it 
has so little entropy.  In how many ways those at the top can continue to 
appropriate such an absurd share of national income and wealth, and by 
continuing to do the same ‘low hanging fruit’-type activities they do?  In fact, 
while the S&P500 was soaring more than 320% between 2009 and mid-2018 
―the longest bull market on record, which created more than US$18tn of 
(virtual) wealth―, the median US household wealth was actually falling.23   
For Stiglitz, reviving old ideas of “secular stagnation” is just too 
convenient a way to rationalise all this.24  For him, when President Barack Obama 
inexplicably turned to the same individuals bearing culpability for the under-
regulation of the economy to fix what they had helped break, the economy 
languished; so, “they found the idea of secular stagnation attractive, because it 
explained their failures … ”.25  I would just add that secular stagnation-type of 
thinking has also become a rather convenient excuse for the ‘new alchemists’ 
implementing policies advocated by the most powerful interest groups of this 
post-modern world.  Obama should have known better: as Minsky (1986) 
                                                                                                                         
higher interest rates.  
18  http://delong.typepad.com/sdj/2008/03/dealing-with-ad.html 
19  The recurrent financial crises of the 1990s were in part about that; see Wade (1998); 





22  Saez y Zucman (2016). 
23  Collins and Hoxie (2018).  
24  Stiglitz (2018). 
25  Ibid.  For Summers’ response, see Summers (2018).  
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reminds us, “economics …is certainly too important to be left to …[financial] 
courtiers”.  
Adam Smith must be turning in his grave by the new idealisation of 
‘abnormal’ market returns preached his supposed followers.  As the FT’s US 
Managing Editor stated, “Nobody should underestimate the degree to which those 
QE experiments have distorted the financial system”.26   
Does anyone still remember that the neo-liberal reforms were sold by the 
Washington Consensus and Institutions as necessary for “getting the prices 
right”?  Instead, financial liberalisation has led to a financial game which is 
steered by just two main players, both determined (though for different reasons) 
to get the prices “as wrong as possible”: the ‘new alchemists’, and the new 
Titanic-style institutional speculator.27   
Unfortunately, Eugene Fama did not reply to our request for an “efficient 
capital market” view.   
 
1.- The 2018 Roller-Coaster and the 2020 Déjà Vu  
Figure 1 shows the sharp swings in the S&P500 during January and February 
2018, which was the prelude for the new distorted cycle of “manias, panics and 
renewed-manias”.   
FIGURE 1 
 
● The index is shown in thousands; and rates of growth indicated in the figure are for the 
respective phase.  The same in subsequent figures.  
● Source: S&P Dow Jones Indices (2020). 
 
                                           
26  https://www.ft.com/content/0d8b3fc8-1c95-11e8-aaca-4574d7dabfb6.   
27  Previous players of this size, like JP Morgan, at least understood the responsibilities that 
came with having such a leading market role (Sobel, 1965). 
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Basically, thanks to the ‘new alchemists’ financial markets are now able to 
dismiss panics as if they were mere “tail risks” (risks of rare events), or simple 
“black swan events” (unusual events that are hard-to-predict as they are beyond 
the realm of normal expectations) ―even if they are anything but.  And the 
degree of generalised amnesia following this new-style financial-crisis cycle is 
such that I would not be surprised if many readers of this paper do not even 
remember what happened in those two months of 2018 ―even though that was 
certainly no ordinary event: as already mentioned, it was characterised by the 
biggest ever recorded sudden change from exuberance to agony over a period of 
two weeks since records began more than a century ago ―according to the 
London’s Longview Economics, the S&P had never ever fallen so far so fast from 
a record high.28  And as the Dow then suffered its worst fall in absolute terms in 
its history, it led to the greatest withdrawal from global equity funds on record.  
It was also the end of one of the oldest and strongest bull market in history (in 
some metrics the top-1), it had the largest percentage jump on record of the 
“Vix” index of US stock market volatility, and so on.   
In other words, what happened in February 2018 should go down in 
financial history for at least three reasons: the most vertiginous transitions from 
mania to panic ever; the same in terms of a sharp change from stability to 
volatility ―as what preceded it was a year (2017) characterised by having the 
lowest share volatility in more than half a century, and what followed was a 
baseless 8% jump in January, only for this to switch to an even greater fall in 
share prices in just nine trading days; and finally, for the ‘V’-shape of things to 
come in finance, as indicated by the immediate recovery of the S&P500 in late 
February (another 8%).  
In this post-2008-type financial market the ‘new alchemists’ believe that 
the most effective way to deal with the problem of the “too big to fail” agents is 
to keep them always sweet.  And to keep major players (and their powerful 
lobby) sweet means credible assurances of the “whatever it takes”-type for life to 
continue in a perpetual financial mania mode.  
However, as we already know, credit booms weaken (rather than 
strengthen) output in the medium run;29 and increased market inequality is likely 
to have a negative impact on growth.30  Also, as the richest 10% in the US 
already own about 80% of overall wealth, including six of every seven stocks 
held by individuals (and the richest 1% own half), more stock market bubbles are 
unlikely to boost expenditure much (even the unproductive kind) as they will just 
shift even more wealth to those ‘cash-hoarding’ agents who are already 
responsible for the ‘savings glut’.  As Krueger remarks,  
The top 1 percent of households saves about half of the increases in their wealth, 
while the population at large has a general savings rate of about 10%.  This 
implies that if another $1.1 trillion had been earned by the bottom 99% instead of 
the top 1%, annual consumption would be about US$440 billion higher.31   
Furthermore, global debt —and its components— had already swelled by 50% in 
the decade since the credit crisis, and financial fragility was evident 
everywhere.32  Indeed, in the year before the February 2018 fiasco there had 
                                           
28   See https://www.ft.com/content/4e3f2b56-0cf0-11e8-839d-41ca06376bf2.  
29  See Borio et al. (2018); Lombardi et al. (2017); and Mian et al., 2017.  
30  See Ostry et al. (2014); and Palma (2019a).  
31  Krueger (2012).  See also www.nytimes.com/2018/08/22/business/bull-
marketstocks.html  
32  For example, in the US “half the core business of financing or refinancing houses [was 
already] under water” (www.ft.com/content/4bcd8d88-70ba-3bea-9d3b-6affa23cf8a9). 
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already been a US$6 trillion worth of global private credit expansion ―and just in 
the US junk bonds had already reached the US$ 4 trillion mark, and half of all 
investment-grade corporate bonds were already at BBB, or just one step from 
junk status.33  
An important component of the latter was a mergers and acquisition 
(M&A) mania: between the beginning of QE and the events of February 2018, 
there had been a US$40tn M&A frenzy across the world.  As no one expected any 
significant increase of effective demand, and as there are huge rents to be made 
from oligopolistic and monopsonistic power, a boost in market shares was the 
way forward ―even if this needed ever more “irresponsible” lending so as to 
finance ever more overblown prices for existing assets.   
The main problem with this “irresponsible” lending is that if the financial 
fragilities it creates went wrong it could be ugly: “If [corporate] default rates 
were to reach only 10% —a conservative assumption— the corporate debt fiasco 
will be at least six times larger than the sub-prime losses in 2008”.34  
Nevertheless, for ‘secular stagnationists’ what was needed was just more of the 
same ―when (as mentioned above) what was really necessary was a new form of 
government agency aiming at ‘disciplining’ the capitalist élite into spending 
productively; and a key component of this is to rein in finance (in part by 
following Tobin’s ‘sand on wheels’ advice).  
Furthermore, what secular stagnationists (surprisingly) missed is that 
given relatively low levels of unemployment, sluggish growth must be at least as 
much about the composition of effective demand as about its level; that is, 
increasing inequality driving spending away from its productive component.  In 
the meantime, emerging Asia can’t believe its luck as all of the above opens up 
huge productive opportunities for them ―and many Asian corporations certainly 
know how to take advantage of this.35   
And on the Titanic-style institutional speculator ―those that feeds on the 
mispricing now embedded in asset pricing, and on the fuelling of market 
volatility―, they can now also make money on both sides of the cycle: during the 
panic phase of the current cycle (i.e., from the market peak in February 2020 to 
its lows in March) short positions notched up paper gains of US$375bn.36   
As the chief US equity strategist at Credit Suisse could now say with 
complete confidence in the midst of the panic of the first week of February 2018: 
“Investors … may have been given a gift. … You should be buying into this”.37  
Indeed, the new artificial floor under asset prices built by ‘the new alchemists’ 
create moral hazards of such magnitude that they are capable of driving 
speculators, particularly large ones, up the risk curve.38  In finance the real thing 
to fear is the lack of fear itself. 
In this way, just days after the sudden panic on Monday 5th of February 
2018, speculators’ anxiety was already evaporating thanks to the success of the 
new “therapeutic” role played by the alchemists: that of “holding”, “containing” 
and “boundarying” speculators’ anxieties.  If previously those institutions acted 
as if their main role in this respect was to try to avoid a mania from happening in 
                                           
33  https://dailyreckoning.com/heres-where-the-next-crisis-starts/ 
34  Ibid.  
35  See Chang and Rowthorn (1995); Khan (2015); Andreoni and Chang (2019); and 
Palma (2019b).  
36  See https://s3partners.com/product-data.html 
37  https://www.ft.com/content/4a6a8c26-0bdf-11e8-8eb7-42f857ea9f09.  
38  https://www.ft.com/content/75587aa6-1f1f-4e9d-b334-3ff866753fa2.   
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the first place, and to bring back some calm into markets when panics did 
happened ―which meant allowing price corrections if some irrational exuberance 
had distorted the pricing of financial assets―, now they seem to think that their 
key role is just to contain speculators’ panic by providing unlimited liquidity to 
artificially engineer a new upswing. 
And in this new post-modern world, the new alchemists have the cheek to 
call what they do “an appropriate ‘Keynesian’ response to a supposed period of 
secular stagnation”.  (Yeah, right).  
So, let’s keep pumping liquidity so as to allow financial mischief to go on, 
and thus keep the illusion that financial markets can violate the first and second 
law of thermodynamics, becoming virtual perpetual motion machines ―one with 
a continuous motion (mania) that requires no real fundamentals.  
A century ago financial markets did have JP Morgan-sized agents as well, 
but (paraphrasing Oscar Wilde) the difference is that now the new Titanic-style 
speculator may well know the price of everything, but surely they know the value 
of nothing.   
As long as the new ‘therapists’ keep performing the emotional holding of 
the speculator’s anxiety ―i.e., no matter how much alarm, confusion, distress, 
and pain can emerge in a panic, the new shrink will always be there with his or 
her attuned, solid and trustworthy presence and a bottomless wallet― this will 
create such a semblance of a safe and boundaried environment that it will 
become the recipe for market discipline becoming freedom to run amok.   
How long will the inevitable mounting fiscal costs of successive rescue 
operations, and of successive QE-led reflation ―and their ever growing 
distortions in financial markets― be sustainable in the long run is, of course, a 
different matter, as well as how bad will the long-term negative impact of this be 
on the real economy.   
As already mentioned, events in January and February 2018 took place 
after a year with the lowest share volatility since before the 1973 oil-shock.  
Shares not only went up at a fast rate ―the “S&P500” stock market index 
increased by a fifth, the Dow by a quarter, and the Nasdaq not far short of a 
third―, but they did so in a surprisingly stable way.  In fact, during 2017 the 
S&P500 went as far as to rise every month of the year, something which had 
















FIGURE 2   
 
● Source: S&P Dow Jones Indices (2020). 
 
The stable rise of 2017 suddenly switched to a remarkable price-surge in 
January; and then equally suddenly (and again, for no convincing reason) this 
bull market turned into a precipitous fall, losing more than their total January 
gains in just a few trading days.   
The remarkable contrast between the stable growth of 2017 shown above 
and the sharp swings of February becomes evident in the Vix (or Velocity Shares 














                                           
39  The VIX is a measure of the “implied volatility” of the S&P500 ― implied, that is, by the 




●  Source: http://www.cboe.com/products/vix-index-volatility/vix-options-and-futures/vix-
index/vix-historical-data. 
 
Although the VIX is an easy way to make gains in a stable market (2017), the 
sharp volatility of just one day (5th of February, when index trebled, its greatest 
percentage jump on record), turned into a carnage for holders of the note as by 
Tuesday it had already fallen by 93% in value.  However, as a columnist of the FT 
remarked by the middle of February, the recurrent amnesia in financial markets 
is such that “not even the Vix horror show is deterring new suckers”.40   
Figure 4 indicates how this new “V-shaped” cycle was replicated in 2020.  
Following a relatively stable 2019 (with similarities to 2017), the Covid-19 panic 
led to a sudden fall of one-third of the S&P500 index, just for it to turn 
immediately into a sharp rise ―in fact, the upswing was so swift that a bear-
market recovery started within one week’s time.  By the middle of August the 
index was already back to pre-Covid-19 levels, only to continue its ascend 









                                           
40  https://www.ft.com/content/4b629a6a-126a-11e8-940e-08320fc2a277 
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FIGURE 4  
 
● Source: S&P Dow Jones Indices (2020). 
 
However, the specificity of this “V-shaped” recovery is that it hides its “K shaped” 
soul: while five tech-giants (which now represents more than a fifth of the 
S&P500) went through the roof, one fifth of the companies were at the end of 
this period still more than 50% below their all-time highs ―with the median stock 
still 28% below its peak.  
Figure 5 shows the top part of the “k”, as reflected in the Nasdaq 
Composite Index ―where more than a “V-shaped” recovery there was a Nike’s 



















● Source: Nasdaq (2020).  
 
As Figure 5 indicates, the new alchemists succeed in increasing the net worth of a 
few executives and shareholders of a handful of firms beyond their wildest 
dreams; and short sellers became an endangered specie in this US$13 trillion 
rebound.41  According to Bloomberg, “buying surged among professional 
investors [mainly because they] were forced back into stocks despite a recession, 
stagnating profits and the prospect of a messy presidential election”.42  A falling 
dollar was providing a further boost.43   
This sharp rebound has renewed fears about the growing disconnect 
between ‘Wall Street and Main Street’.  As Figure 6 indicates, during the second 
quarter of 2020, while the US economy shrank by 9.5% vis-à-vis its previous 
quarter ―at an annualised rate of 33%―, the S&P 500 jumped to a new record 
high in August.  Indeed, while output, employment and investment were sinking 
like a stone, the new low in the US-China relation, and the prospect of a chaotic 
US election one financial insider lamented, “…our biggest mistake may be that we 




                                           
41  https://www.bloomberg.com/amp/news/articles/2020-08-21/bears-are-going-extinct-
in-stock-market-s-13-trillion-rebound  
42  Ibid.  
43  For Rogoff (2020), “At some point, markets will be disabused of the notion that 
taxpayers will cover everything indefinitely.”  Well, I don't see that happening any time 
soon!  




● Source: S&P Dow Jones Indices (2020); and BEA Data (2020).  
 
This is not really the world according to the ‘efficient capital market’ theory, 
where there cannot be an endogenous gap between stock-market prices and 
economic fundamentals —let alone a bubble.  That is, asset prices deserve a 
pedestal, and stock options (even in a world of massive shares buybacks) are the 
most rational reward for good performance.  Also, as it is claimed that stock 
prices are a ‘random walk’, they are supposed to be unpredictable and cannot be 
modelled or forecasted.  It follows that under risk neutrality there is no scope for 
profitable speculation because a rational stock market cannot be beaten on any 
consistent basis (Warren Buffet must think that this is a Chicago joke…). 
Furthermore, if asset-prices get misaligned, they will always self-correct 
because ‘smart’ market players would simply force stock prices to become 
rational by doing exactly the opposite of what they do in real life: take the other 
side of trades if prices begin to develop a pattern ―as this is bound to have no 
substance.  In other words, for the efficient capital market theology a ‘rational’ 
surfer is not the one who has fun riding waves, but the one who gets drowned 
trying to create undertows.45  
This theory became such powerful hegemonic consensus that while Bernie 
Madoff was laughing all the way to the bank, Alan Greenspan was still arguing 
against tightening regulation against financial fraud, “as rational markets can 
take care of themselves”.46  However, as we now know, under his watch the 
                                           
45  Soon after the 2008 debacle, I was invited to be a member of a panel to nominate 
candidates for the biannual ‘Deutsche Bank Prize in Financial Economics’ (worth 50,000 
euros); the first ever prize had been given to Eugene Fama in 2005 for developing his 
intellectual weapon of mass destruction.  
46  http://www.dailykos.com/story/2009/3/27/172419/727.  This statement reminds us of 
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system already had rampant flows of tainted money;47 and five global banks —
JPMorgan, HSBC, Standard Chartered, Deutsche Bank and Bank of New York 
Mellon― were helping shadowy characters and criminals to move staggering 
sums of illicit cash around the world, in a scam that reached US$2 trillion.48  And 
HSBC's subsidiaries were transporting billions of dollars of cash in armoured 
vehicles for Mexican drug lords, clearing suspicious travellers' cheques worth 
billions, helping drug-related mass murders to buy planes with money laundered 
through Cayman Islands accounts, and moving at least US$7bn from Mexico into 
the bank's US operations.  And other subsidiaries were moving money from 
countries on US sanctions lists, and helping a Saudi bank linked to Al-Qaida to 
shift money to the US.49  There is no doubt about it: ‘rational markets’ certainly 
know how to take care of themselves!  
In terms of Figure 6, the ‘disconnect’ between the real and the financial in 
2020 was such that despite the massive economic downturn the S&P500 was 
trading at some of the highest multiples since the dot-com era ―e.g., 26 times 
forecast earnings.  In fact, the mood in financial markets was so cheerful that 
Citygroup’s Panic/Euphoria Model, a sentiment gauge, was in a blissful mood 
―one not seen since the dot-com bubble as well.  (Figure 7)   
FIGURE 7 
 
● This model tracks metrics from options trading to short sales and newsletter bullishness.  
● Source: http://www.city-group.com/. 
 
                                                                                                                         
Mencken’s remarks: “For every complex problem, there is always an answer that is clear, 
simple and wrong” 
(https://archive.org/details/NotesonDemocracyH.L.Mencken11/page/n41/mode/2up).  
47  https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-54225572 
48  FinCEN Files (2020). 
49  https://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/jul/17/hsbc-executive-resigns-senate 
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At the end of August the reading of City’s model, at around 1.1, was almost three 
times the level that denotes euphoria, also showing the longest run of extreme 
bullishness for three decades.  During this fastest bear-market recovery in 
history,50 options traders were just piling in on bullish wagers while bears were 
fast disappearing ―precisely at times that were ripe for scepticism!  In fact, while 
some bets on a continuous rise in share prices were so large that they behaved 
as “whales”, the economy and corporate profits were stuck in a huge recession.  
Banking on a perpetual fiscal and monetary stimulus, the fear of underperforming 
the market prompted money managers to chase the gains, despite bleak 
prospects for the real economy and WHO’s warnings about the pandemic 
becoming endemic ―they could just not miss on the next Tesla.  
It is difficult to imagine a market more ripe for a major correction!  As 
Carmen Reinhart, chief economist of the World Bank, notes, “If you look at 
financial sector vulnerabilities, …it is difficult to not be pretty bleak”.51 
 
2.- The “Up and down” Analysts and the Upheavals of 2018 
Paul Krugman once said that there were three types of economists, one of which 
were the “up and down” ones ―those who analyse the daily comings and goings 
of the market, and see their job as having to embellish whatever is going on in 
finance, believing that their primary mission in life is constantly to generate a 
positive spin on events, dressing them up with explanations that are simple, 
mechanical and invariably ‘optimistic’.  In 2018, they first generated a positive 
spin on the January mania, then on the panic, and finally concocted another one 
for the renewed-mania that followed.  Everything was just ‘rational behaviour’ on 
the part of agents reacting reflexively to new information.  
 
2.1.- The January 2018 Mania 
Among the many “up and down” explanations, three stand out: consumer 
confidence, Trump’s new plan for investment on infrastructure, and his tax 
reform.  On the first, as many people view stocks as a barometer for the 
economy −even though few own stocks directly− towards the end of 2017 
consumer confidence had jumped to a 17-year high.  On the second, at the start 
of 2018 Trump announced “the biggest and boldest infrastructure investment in 
American history”, involving a potential expenditure (private and public) of 
US$1.5tn.  For financial markets always anxious for ‘good news’ that might 
justify exuberance, little did it matter that this plan was obviously “fake news” 
―and nothing came out of it.  In fact, Congress (controlled by the President’s 
Party) immediately announced that they were only prepared to increase the 
infrastructure budget by US$21 billion ―or slightly more than just 1% of Trump’s 
proposal.  
Finally, Trump’s other piece of “good news”, his tax reform, had a bit 
more substance ―at least for those at the top and for big corporations as it was 
the biggest corporate tax cut in US history.  Although Trump described it as “a 
giant tax cut for the middle class”, almost half of the (massive) benefits were 
destined for the top 1%, while those earning less than US$75,000 a year would 
loss out.52  As a Forbes highlighted, “The GOP Tax Plan Scrooges Middle Class, 
                                           
50  On some metrics the recovery in 1982 was even faster.  




Retired And Poor”.53  It was also bound to add another US$1,5 trillions to the 
deficit; and according to Fortune, “Never in modern times have we seen tax cuts 
being implemented … with debt to GDP north of 100%”.54  In turn, it was going 
to have a minimum impact on growth; according to Moody's it would add only 0.1 
or 0.2 percentage points to GDP growth in 2018; and for JPMorgan’s Funds chief 
global strategist, “the bump to growth in 2018 will likely be a one-year 
wonder."55  But, for the “up and down” analysts, the late December tax reform 
was just unqualified great news, and their excitement reached new heights. 
Furthermore, as the inevitable substantial increase in issuing US 
Treasuries to pay for these tax cuts was bound to absorb such a large share of 
dollar liquidity, a crisis in the rest of the dollar bond markets was highly likely 
(and in fact it did happen) ―especially because at the same time the FED was 
about to trim its balance sheet. 
 Meanwhile, the few “fiscal conservatives” still left among Congressional 
Republicans were totally dumbstruck ―but they still supported the tax cut.56 
 The true nature of this tax reform became evident when a corporation 
immediately announced that their 2017 post-tax profits were magically going to 
nearly double (from US$36bn to US$65bn).57  Even the chief economics 
commentator at the FT called this tax cut “A Republican tax plan built for 
plutocrats”.58  And another columnist rightly asked: “Have they all lost their 
collective minds?”59  
In fact, following the tradition of Republican tax cuts started by Reagan, 
the greatest beneficiaries were financial markets and the plutocrats connected to 
the old technology paradigm, particularly the most polluting ones.  As the FT 
points out, “Oil refiners, railroads, airlines and banks are expected to be among 
the biggest beneficiaries”.60 
In the meantime, large technology companies would benefit mainly by 
“…repatriating …cash for equity buybacks”.61  Apple, for example, “returned” to 
shareholders in the form of buybacks and dividends another US$100bn on top of 
the US$210bn already distributed since 2012 ―a sum that was greater than the 
market value of all but 20 of the biggest listed companies.62   
In turn, while the US was already falling back in the tech areas which 
were going to underpin the industrial internet and machine to machine 
communication that every company in every industry will depend on for growth 
in the following decade, Cisco Systems announced that it would spend buying 
back its own shares more than three times what they would spend in 




economy-to-fearing-the-debt/.  See also http://fortune.com/2018/03/15/us-national-debt-
trump-tax-cuts/. 
55  http://money.cnn.com/2017/12/29/investing/stocks-2017-wall-street/index.html. 
56  Even Rand Paul voted in favour; in Trumpian times, dissent is a luxury that few can 
afford…   
57  https://www.ft.com/content/d4b0b188-196f-11e8-956a-43db76e69936. 
58  https://www.ft.com/content/e494f47e-ce1a-11e7-9dbb-291a884dd8c6 
59  https://www.zerohedge.com/news/2018-02-11/have-they-all-lost-their-collective-
minds 
60  https://www.ft.com/content/9eef31ba-e13d-11e7-8f9f-de1c2175f5ce  
61  Ibid.   
62  https://www.ft.com/content/1c85aaf0-4f7a-11e8-a7a9-37318e776bab. 
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investment.63  In fact, a report by Morgan Stanley indicated that in the 550 
corporations it studied, private investment was hardly mentioned in the plans for 
using tax windfalls.  Trump’s “America first” policy did not seem to extend to the 
industries of the future, just to those of the past.  Meanwhile, China was getting 
further ahead in the global race to 5G;64 and was challenging the US for artificial 
intelligence dominance.65  It already had more ‘super-computers’ than the US.66  
To state the obvious, sustainable growth comes from enriching the technology 
ecosystem as a whole, not the net worth of a few executives and shareholders of 
a handful of firms. 
But with such short-sighted and easily thrilled “up and down” analysts, the 
initial reaction to the approval by the Senate of the tax-bill on December 20 (on a 
party-line vote of 51 to 48) was just like throwing petrol on their already rampant 
euphoria.  In turn, Christine Lagarde proclaimed at Davos (in the World Economic 
Forum) in January that she was “consigning the troubles of the past decade to 
history”.67  And other reports spoke of a cyclical growth-path permeating all 
corners of the world ―including (would you believe!) Latin America!68   
 This rampant mania was the perfect scenario for Trump’s majestic 
appearance at Davos to proclaim Urbi et Orbi that thanks to the greatness of his 
administration “the stock market was smashing one record after another”; and 
(incorrectly) that it was up “almost 50% since my election”.69   
The same frame of mind was permeating to all the financial press; one of 
the FT best known analysts was even speculating whether, finally, “secular 
stagnation had morphed into secular expansion”.70  Difficult to remember a 
Davos with such ebullient mood.  Even the 100-year Argentinean bond was 
trading at 105% of its face value!71   
 Just a few days later, all this exhilaration morphed into a sudden panic: on 
Monday February 5th ―while some self-satisfied guests were still skiing at 
Davos― the Dow suffered its worst fall in absolute terms in its history (it fell 
1.175 points). The S&P500 and the Nasdaq were not far behind.  And those 
remaining guests at Davos had to scramble for the airport, as in the blink of an 
eye global stock markets lost US$5 trillion in value; and records kept being 
broken, one after another.72   
 
 
                                           
63  https://www.ft.com/content/99fbaf9e-4ef2-11e8-9471-a083af05aea7.  See also 
Philippon (2019) for the chronic under-investment in the industries of the future.  
64  http://www.analysysmason.com/About-Us/News/Press-releases/china-holds-narrow-
lead-in-global-race-to-5G-Apr2018/?bp=%252fPress%252f. 
65  https://www.ft.com/content/b799cb04-2787-11e8-9274-2b13fccdc744. 
66  Of top 500 supercomputers, China owned 202, while the US just 143 
(https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-44439515). 
67  https://www.ft.com/content/d900ef2e-ff74-11e7-9650-9c0ad2d7c5b5.   
68  https://www.fulcrumasset.com/latest-research/ 
69  In fact, it was 34% higher (https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/01/president-
donald-trumps-davos-address-in-full-8e14ebc1-79bb-4134-8203-95efca182e94/). 
70  https://www.ft.com/content/38fbdf1a-678d-3c92-8df0-9ee5ba890fae.  
71  https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-09/argentina-century-bond-yield-
jumps-as-imf-aid-requested-chart.   
72  To the already mentioned greatest jump on record of the “Vix” volatility index, 
“Investors yanked a record $30.6bn from global equity funds this week ― the most on 
record” (https://www.ft.com/content/9ceb6136-0d66-11e8-839d-41ca06376bf2). 
 20 
2.2.- The Panic of the First Week of February: how could it not be 
the fault of wages! 
The immediate consensus among “up and down” analysts was that the main 
culprit of the sudden downturn was the news that nominal wages in the US had 
risen in January 0.2 percentage points more than the “expected” in annual terms.  
What a calamity!  
 The “up and down” analysts, of course, didn’t bother to explain why a 
nominal growth in wages of 2.6% over the year was apparently unsustainable in 
the upswing of the cycle, while a growth in earnings per share of ten times that 
amount was perfectly reasonable and sustainable.  Worse still, they omitted to 
mention that in spite of this minor wage increase, labour’s share of national 
income had actually fallen, yet again, in 2017.73  
 Adding to this, just a few days later the US price index for January showed 
an annual rise of 2.1%, also fractionally higher than the “expected” figure 
―though perfectly within the range wanted by the FED.  Furthermore, the FED’s 
favoured inflation measure (the ‘core personal consumption expenditures’ index, 
which excludes the volatile food and energy components) was still below 2% on 
the year, which not only had remained at a level almost unchanged for several 
months, but also again within a range that was perfectly acceptable to the Fed.74   
 In fact, these two events would normally have passed by almost unnoticed 
―especially because preliminary wage and inflation data are notoriously noisy 
and prone to revision.  But the “up and down” analysts had to find a culprit for 
the stock-market collapse, and what better than wage inflation!  Furthermore, 
this could also be twisted into “markets reacting to good news”: an economic 
recovery that may be getting out of control.  Trump, of course, didn’t miss the 
chance: “In the “old days,” when good news was reported, the Stock Market 
would go up. Today, when good news is reported, the Stock Market goes down. 
Big mistake, and we have so much good (great) news about the economy!”75  
A further twist to this saga is that the small wage rise “above 
expectations” of January was soon revised downwards, as it was reported that 
the annual increase in wages had been actually at perfectly “expected” levels.  So, 
everyone could now happily enjoy the renewed-mania party ―the Ponzi of virtual 
currencies included. 
Among the many new factors playing an amplifying role on both sides of 
swings, the rise of passive index funds, in particular the exchange traded funds 
chasing the S&P500 index and mapping the Vix volatility index stands out.  
Another is online technology which now allows armchair speculators to enter and 
exit markets en masse in a way not possible in the past.  And the rapidly growing 
concentration in share ownership did not help either.  
 
2.3.- The End-of-February Renewed-Mania  
By the end of February the new FED chair was already proclaiming that 
“headwinds may be turning into tailwinds”.76  And for one of the most influential 
reports, the severe share fall was just “a mean reversion in global growth” 
―although this “… may be happening earlier than expected by the models”.77  In 
                                           
73  https://www.oxfordeconomics.com/my-oxford/publications/432844.   
74  See https://www.ft.com/content/80829dba-4c6e-11e8-8a8e-22951a2d8493.  
75  https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/961253168968622086. 
76  https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/powell20180226a.htm. 
77  Quoted in https://www.ft.com/content/2edbbd76-1e37-11e8-aaca-4574d7dabfb6. 
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turn, a well-known “up and down” analyst stated that it was just part of a 
synchronised pick-up in global economic activity, “turbocharged by the 
implementation of pro-growth fiscal measures and deregulation, as well as 
brighter prospects for an infrastructure boost.  Meanwhile, …the US central bank 
continues the “beautiful normalisation” of unconventional measures”. 78  And for a 
report just quoted, “the strong global expansion in real output was the dominant 
driver of recent huge financial asset returns”.79   
Even one of the most respected analysts saw the early February collapse 
as “a pause for breath …, since it reduces the risk that a runaway cyclical boom 
will blow the lid off world inflation.80  Inflation?  What inflation?  Runaway cyclical 
boom?  What boom?  (See Figure 8) 
FIGURE 8 
 
●  Trend=average growth of previous 8 quarters.  
●  Source: BEA Data (2020). 
 
As the figure indicates, instead of a ‘runaway cyclical boom’, all that had 
happened was a minor acceleration in the quarterly rate of growth in the second 
half of the year, lifting the difference between them and “trend” growth to just 
0.28% and 0.46%.  How can anyone, let alone a partner of a top investment 
bank, and one of the most senior columnists of the FT, call this a ‘runaway 
cyclical boom’, is a mystery to me.  What amazes me is how easily the ‘story-
telling’ convinces the story-tellers themselves!  JP Morgan did a bit better when it 
                                           
78  https://www.ft.com/content/1f317854-0760-11e8-9650-9c0ad2d7c5b5.     
79  https://www.fulcrumasset.com/latest-research/ 
80  https://www.ft.com/content/2edbbd76-1e37-11e8-aaca-4574d7dabfb6 
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stated that the February panic had been only “a return from the [financial] 
stratosphere”.81  
The renewed-mania that followed was such that “One seasoned fundraiser 
described the mood …as “frenzied”.82  Even though “…dealmakers were already 
experiencing a degree of the emperor’s new clothes”.83  And “[Citi] seem to have 
forgotten the time when they were a buck a share”.84  In fact, for one executive 
at a European multibillion-euro fund “There is a massive amount of vested 
interest for the thing to go on forever.”   
In sum, the “up and down” analysts are a good example of Foucault’s 
(1979) ideas of the relationship between power and knowledge in terms of how 
“expertise” can easily be misused as an exercise of political power.  One group of 
Native Americans used to say, “those who are good at storytelling will dominate 
the world".   
 
3.- “QE” as a Liquidity-Pumping Machine, Which Gave 
Financialisation a Whole New Meaning85 
From the perspective of the ideas of economists like Keynes, Kindleberger and 
Minsky, within a tradition that also includes intellectuals such as Veblen, 
Hilferding and Kalecki ―although each was stressing somewhat different 
dynamics― the basic problem with unregulated and over-liquid financial markets 
is that operational normality can easily turn into manic exuberance, and this into 
profligacy.  QE in fact helped move things in that direction, as Central Banks in 
the US, Europe and Japan injected about US$15tn of liquidity in this form.  The 
crucial assumption of this policy is that once QE had helped calm down financial 
markets after a panic, a continuous wealth-effect in asset-holders would set the 
economy in motion again.  
 In fact, the ‘new alchemists’ had responded to a crisis caused by excess 
leverage by accumulating more (in fact, much more), not less, debt of all kinds. 
And banking fragilities had not really gone away as, for example, most US bank 
derivatives books became even larger than when Bear Stearns had to be 
rescued.86 
Furthermore, QE’s capacity to reactivate the real economy has been 
minimal, as this extra liquidity has been used for anything but creating more 
productive capacities ―as quoted above, less than 1% in the UK.  And lacking 
shareholder’s support to invest, executives struggled to turn modest economic 
growth into higher earnings; so, companies started borrowing to spend on buying 
their own stock and increasing dividends, which provided a boost to the prize of 
the stock and to the size dividends reported per share.87  According to Dealogic, 
                                           
81  Ibid.  
82  https://www.ft.com/content/0a1067b0-1c9f-11e8-aaca-4574d7dabfb6 
83  Ibid. 
84  Quoted in https://www.ft.com/content/201bce0c-289b-11e8-b27e-cc62a39d57a0. 
85  By ‘financialisation’ I understand the rise in size and dominance of the financial sector 
relative to the non-financial sector, as well as the diversification towards financial activities 
in non-financial corporations.   
86  At the end of 2017, five of the biggest US banks had derivatives books worth US$157tn 
— twice global GDP.  This was much higher than the amount these banks had when 
entering the 2008 crisis.   
87  https://www.ft.com/content/713a378c-01d7-11e8-9650-9c0ad2d7c5b5.  On Apple, see, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-43965870).  
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between 2000 and 2017 equity withdrawn from the market reached US$5 
trillion.88  
Another of the many QE-induced distortions is that “…pension savers — 
virtually all of us — may find to our horror that we are the [QE] schmucks”.89  
Furthermore, low levels of corporate investment with rising corporate saving 
drives the growing mismatch between abundant liquidity and a relative shortage 
of solid financial assets, making the ease of performing a transaction in a hollow 
security or instrument the trademark of the current process of financialisation. 
In sum, according to the chief economist of the Bank of England, the new 
environment brought about “corporate self-cannibalism” as an unholy alliance 
between a new breed of ‘active’ ―i.e., bullying― shareholders and self-seeking 
executives has led to companies being dismantled, or condemned to debt, in 
order to increase immediate income.  If shareholders used to get 10% of 
corporate profits, they now want it all (and more); and where they once kept 
shares for six years, they now keep them for less than six months, implying far 
less concern for the long-term health of the firm.  For Keynes (1936), in contrast, 
the health of the corporate sector depends on building a relationship between 
shareholders and firms “like a marriage”.  
And on the QE-fuelled M&A frenzy ―the biggest anti-competition drive 
ever (as already mentioned, over US$40tn across the world during its first 
decade)―, in three US$200bn M&A, Dow Chemical merged with DuPont, the 
Chinese company ChemChina bought the Swiss Syngenta, and Bayer bought 
Monsanto.  And "The three new conglomerates [now] controlled more than 60% 
of the seed and agrochemical market, supplied almost all GMOs (genetically 
modified organisms), and [owned] the majority of patents on plants in the 
world."90  
If the US had the same level of GDP as now, but its share of investment to 
GDP were as it was pre-Reagan ―i.e., at the end of the “financial repression” 
era―, over US$ 1 trillion more would be invested per year.  In fact, net private 
investment all but disappeared.91  As Figure 9 indicates, non-residential private 
investment as a share of the income of the top 1% fell as if in a roller coaster 
―from nearly 120% at the time of the election of Reagan to low 40s during the 












                                           
88  http://www.dealogic.com/. 
89  https://www.ft.com/content/2a165852-90ae-11e8-b639-7680cedcc421 
90  Heinrich Böll Foundation (2017). 




● fin assets=stock of financial assets; priv inv=fixed private investment; and a=the 
2008 financial crisis.  Acronyms as the internet domain codes of each country; in top-left 
panel, Malaysia’s current percentage is 77%; Taiwan’s 74%; and Korea’s 62%.  3-year 
moving averages.   
● Sources: WID (2020) for income shares; FED (2020) for financial assets; BEA Data 
(2020) for private investment (includes equipment and non-residential structures); and 
WEO (2020) and WDI (2020) for the rest. 
 
In turn, overall private investment as a percentage of the income share of the 
top 10% has also fallen from 55% to about 25% during this period ―or to a level 
similar to Brazil’s.  This is yet another indication of the US’s (and other high-
income OECD countries’) “reverse catching up” with countries at the other side of 
the Rio Grande: ―the higher the share of income appropriated by the top, the 
lower the proportion of that income that was returned to the economy in a 
productive manner. 
Indeed, in many areas the US is now well ahead: the retirement assets of 
just 100 CEOs, for example, add up to as much as the entire retirement savings 
of more than 116 million people at the bottom of the pay scale.92  And the ratio 
of CEOs pay to that of average workers has rocketed ―while CEO compensation 
has grown 940% since Reagan whereas that of the median worker has risen only 
12%.93  And the neo-liberal ideology has been most helpful in this endeavour.   
                                           
92  www.ips-dc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Two-Retirements-final-pdf.pdf  
93  EPI (2019). 
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And the wheels of QE financialisation keep turning.  Private equity assets 
under management doubled to US$3tn between 2008 and the financial upheavals 
of February 2018;94 and private equity managers have borrowed record sums 
during the pandemic, using ever riskier credit facilities.95  In turn, credit mutual 
funds have tripled in size since the 2008 financial crisis.  And as financialisation 
promises both to boost asset prices for ever, and always provide unlimited cheap 
finance, over a third of those buying homes in the US in 2017 made offers 
without even bothering to see the property in question ―and in places with 
greater speculative frenzy, such as Los Angeles, the proportion reached more 
than half.96   
And in 2020 financialisation has delivered the hottest possible August in 
global equities, and a record US$210bn issuance of corporate bonds; and 
September just witnessed its biggest week for IPOs since Uber came to market.  
It did not seem relevant that in the second quarter of 2020 defaults of non-
financial corporate bonds had already reached a record US$94bn (with the US 
accounting for nearly 75% of this), or that over US$13tn of bonds will come due 
through end-2021 in mature markets, and that emerging markets are in the 
same boat (see below).   
Regardless of the above, “… there is a scramble to invest in nearly 
everything on offer”.97  An example of this ‘everything goes’ mania is the boom in 
special purpose acquisition vehicles, or Spacs, which are listed shells that hold no 
operating businesses but intend to acquire them in the future ―currently there 
are “…tens of billions of dollars raised on [them] little more than the hope that 
these plans for deals will come to fruition”.98  It brings to mind South Sea-Bubble 
times, when someone successfully lured investors into putting money on “a 
company for carrying out an undertaking of great advantage, but nobody to 
know”.99  Also of Gregor MacGregor, the Scottish confidence trickster who 
organised a government loan on the London Stock Exchange, and then sold via a 
reputable London bank land certificates, for a fictional Central American 
country.100  
Paraphrasing the FT columnist already quoted, the pandemic has certainly 
not deterred “new suckers” ―these are now even chasing junk-assets such as 
sub-prime mortgage bonds, which are (of course) back in fashion;101 with credit 
default swap making a big come back, “even though it is patently clear that they 
are not fit for purpose”.102  Meanwhile, banks raked record fees for their advice to 
companies on mergers and fundraising.   
                                           
94  https://www.ft.com/content/0a1067b0-1c9f-11e8-aaca-4574d7dabfb6. 






98  Ibid.   
99  MacKay (1841). 
100  https://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-
9780198614128-e-17519;jsessionid=BC7170BF32D3B56A689D2170CB476769  
101  https://www.ft.com/content/6478a8d6-32c3-11e8-b5bf-23cb17fd1498. 
102  https://www.ft.com/content/a6cd6130-542f-11e8-b24e-
cad6aa67e23e?tagToFollow=9100db92-d634-4c0e-aece-e2a59eada73b.  Pope Francis has 
also criticised them for “encouraging the growth of a finance of chance, and of gambling on 
the failure of others, which is unacceptable from the ethical point of view” (quoted in 
https://www.ft.com/content/f966e8b4-945a-45d0-8391-a305b3d8f7f5).  
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According to Minsky (1974), "A fundamental characteristic of our economy, 
is that the financial system swings between robustness and fragility, and these 
swings are an integral part of the process that generates business cycles”.103  
Well, not anymore… Now it swings from fragility to fragility! 
This booming liquidity has also found its way to emerging markets.  With 
unlimited cheap finance, and asset-prices (supposedly) going only up, many of 
them have also joined the ‘everything rally’.104  The IPO market in Brazil, for 
example, is on track for its biggest year since the 2007 Lula’s mania, already up 
151%, and many more companies are in the pipeline.105  And asset prices are 
also on the fast-track.  And in Chile, while GDP was down by 14% (second 
quarter), unemployment up to 3 million, and investment and domestic demand 
down by 20%, asset prices were again rising and mortgage rates were back at 
pre-pandemic record lows ―while non-financial corporate debt is already the 
highest as a share of GDP among emerging markets (except for China).106   
In this Keynesian “inverted-utopia”, emerging markets can now finally 
unite as they have nothing to lose but their real economy!   
In the meantime, the IMF ―now reduced to a mere fire-fighting role due 
to such abundance of liquidity everywhere― is calling for urgent action to prevent 
a major debt crisis in emerging economies as there are some US$3.7tn in bond 
and loans coming due through end-2020, and around US$7tn due through end-
2021.107  In fact, there has been a huge revival of EM hedge funds ready to profit 
from buying bonds at distressed prices à-la vulture funds, evoking memories of 
Elliott Management’s US$2.4bn payday in 2016.108  So, “The IMF will be very firm 
on pushing for [emerging] countries to get discounts”.109 
In fact, rather than just ‘pushing for discounts’, what the IMF should be 
concentrating on is working towards an overhaul of the global monetary system, 
as the current ad hoc framework ―which evolved in a piecemeal fashion after the 
breakdown of the Bretton Woods arrangement in the early 1970s―, (as Ocampo, 
2017, convincingly demonstrates) is not really a coherent system. 
Part of the problem everywhere is that this tsunami of liquidity is falling 
into “lightly” regulated markets.  One mainstream argument supporting this 
emerges from a “prisoners’ dilemma” setting in interactive games.  These 
scenarios see naturally selfish individuals ―entirely for their own selfish 
reasons― having great incentives to behave in the market in a way that is 
pleasant, tolerant and unenvious.  So, if those predestined to win are the nice 
guys, and as ‘rational markets can take care of themselves’, why worry about 
regulating financial markets in the first place?  
‘New Labour’ Blair & Brown have shown the way forward: they took away 
from the Bank of England the role of financial supervision and regulation, and 
created a new regulatory body as an ‘independent non-governmental body’ (i.e., 
a company limited by guarantee), financed by the financial services industry, 
with ex-bankers as Chairman and as Chief Executive Officer.  Thus, New Labour 
                                           
103  See also Minsky (1992). 
104  https://www.ft.com/content/2895520f-5d23-4add-a431-7cc954fb78a4  
105  https://www.ft.com/content/da448e33-f8a1-43d4-b910-99ded84670d7; and 
https://www.iif.com/Portals/0/Files/content/Research/Global%20Debt%20Monitor_July202
0.pdf? 
106  Avdjiev, S et al. (2020).  
107  Georgieva, et al. (2020); and IFF (2020).  
108  https://www.ft.com/content/d957180b-93da-482a-8683-d690ce20f267 
109  https://www.ft.com/content/f7157356-e773-47c4-b05d-8624a5ccfd03.    
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found a rather ingenious solution for ‘regulatory capture’: if lobbyists inevitably 
succeed in capturing the regulators, why not make them the regulators in the 
first place?   
No wonder that when Mrs Thatcher, when asked in one of her last 
interviews “what would she consider to be her finest political achievement?”, she 
answered: “Transforming Labour into New Labour”.  A great example of how neo-
liberals succeeded in "manufacturing consent” among the ‘new’ left, in Chomsky's 
sense, for the purpose of hegemonic domination.110   
In turn, as ‘light-touch’ regulation relaxes operating standards, corruption 
becomes ever more common.  But stating that corruption is intrinsic in over-
liquid and poorly regulated ‘too-big-to-jail’ financial markets is like going to the 
circus and watching a magician apparently sawing a person in half, and then 
complaining that it’s only a trick.  
But what can be expected if even the FED and the Bank of England have 
now apparently ‘joined in’?  While the EU took out of circulation its largest 
denomination bill to combat money laundering, the FED, instead, has doubled the 
number of hundred-dollar bills in circulation since 2008 (to US$1.3tn), making it 
the most widely used dollar-note.  That is, as the chair of the FT editorial board 
states, “in a supposed ‘digital era’, now there are 13 billion hundred-dollar bills 
stuffed into wallets, safes and suitcases globally helping hide transactions”.111  In 
turn, in the UK ―another country that still issues large notes―, according to its 
National Audit Office (the spending watchdog) 70% of handnotes are ‘missing’ 
(i.e., not in circulation).  And “No one really knows why or where all the money 
has gone” (Yeah, right).112  Then, while admitting that the notes could have been 
taken overseas by criminal gangs and tax evaders, it criticises the Bank of 
England for lack of “reliable information”.  Even the Vatican’s central 
administration office “invested some donations for the poor and needy in 
derivatives …as part of a bet [whether a US corporation] would default on its 
debts”.113  At least the Pope stripped the culprit of his rights as a cardinal.  
As Martin Wolf emphasises, “Rigged capitalism is damaging liberal 
democracy. … Economies are not delivering for most citizens because of weak 
competition, feeble productivity growth and tax loopholes. … because of the rise 
of rentier capitalism”.  And he defines this as “economies in which market and 
political power allow privileged individuals and businesses to extract a great deal 
of rents from everybody else”.114  Mariana Mazzucato (2018) defines it in terms 
of a system in which the few live from extracting the value created by others.  
And in Palma (2019a), I emphasise a similar phenomenon: the fact that now the 
preference of the elite (financial or otherwise) is on getting rich by extracting 
value from those who actually create it.   
We have got to the point where even the rentiers are getting anxious: the 
influential Business Roundtable ―an organization of CEOs from the US’s largest 
publicly listed corporations― is now advocating for fundamental reforms!115 
It is often acknowledged that the only historical legitimacy of capitalism —
that is, the legitimacy of a small elite to appropriate such a large proportion of 
                                           
110  Herman and Chomsky (1988).  
111  www.ft.com/content/4caa021c-3f9d-11e9-9bee-efab61506f44  
112  https://www.nao.org.uk/report/the-production-and-distribution-of-cash/ 
113  https://www.ft.com/content/f966e8b4-945a-45d0-8391-a305b3d8f7f5.  




the social product— rests on that elite’s capacity to use it productively.  Keynes 
(1919), for example, discussing the (investment-intensive) ‘Third Technological 
Revolution’,116 emphasises the contrast between the new rich in ‘emerging’ 
Germany and the US vs. the mature ones in Britain:   
The new rich of the nineteenth century … preferred the power which investment 
gave them to the pleasures of immediate consumption. … Herein lay, in fact, the 
main justification of the capitalist system. If the rich had spent their new wealth 
on their own enjoyments, the world would long ago have found such a régime 
intolerable. 
There is not much danger of finding these enlightened characteristics in the 
current newly rich of the US or Europe (West or East), where new financial 
wealth is spent mostly on their own enjoyment ―including, of course, the 
financial casino.  In contrast to what Keynes says of their counterparts of another 
epoch, in most of today’s newly rich the ‘discreet charm’ of the Latin American 
bourgeoisie rules. 
Meanwhile, high-income countries have seen productivity growth collapse 
since 2008 to about 0.5% p.a.; and emerging Asia ―the eternal heretics of neo-
liberalism― has used this opportunity presented to them to turn the table on the 
West: 
Germany once saw China as an export market for machinery with which China 
would develop its industrial base. Today, China is becoming the senior partner in 
the relationship. [Germany’s] biggest problem is falling behind in the technological 
race. … [This] is symptomatic of a fundamental European problem. … [Now there] 
are signs that complacency is about to turn into panic.117  
Surely it has not been of much use for Germany in this respect to have become 
even more unequal than China in terms of market inequality (Ginis of 52.1 and 
46.9, respectively)118  In fact, while its market Gini went up by 14 points in the 
Gini scale (see below), its share of investment in GDP collapsed from 30% to 
20% (becoming similar to the average Latin American ratio since 1980), leading 
productivity growth to do the same from 5% p.a. to close to zero (again, similar 
to the Latin American average since 1980).119   
 
4.-  Financialisation and inequality 
The asymmetries between investment and inequality discussed above are as 
much the result of the weakness of the former as the vigour of the latter, as “all 
told, the primary effect of monetary policy since 2008 has been to transfer 
wealth to those who already hold long-term assets —both real and financial— 
from those who never will”.120  
Before the pandemic the richest 1% was already appropriating over 80% 
of the World’s new wealth, while the poorest half of humanity got next to 
                                           
116  On this third great surge of industrialization, that of the ‘Age of Steel, Electricity and 
Heavy Engineering’, see Pérez (2002).  
117  www.ft.com/content/19fd8544-3c2f-11e9-b856-5404d3811663 
118  SWIID (2020).  
119  See Palma (2019a).  
120  https://www.ft.com/content/0048beea-766e-11e6-bf48-b372cdb1043a.  The latter, 
although they surely have higher levels of education than their parents, they have now 
minimal probabilities of generating their parents' income or wealth, and a high probability 
of having a number of other problems, such as higher debts of all kinds and worse 
pensions, along with a much lower probability of being owners of their homes 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3rF1W6vSqBc). 
 29 
nothing;121 and in 2020 the former is on course to get it all.  Financialisation has 
surely been part of the problem, as it has helped market inequality in the OECD 
to catch-up with Latin America. (Figure 10). 
FIGURE 10 
 
● Market Gini=Gini before taxes and transfers; a=return to democracy; and b=German 
reunification. 
● Source: SWIID (2020).  As unfortunately this source (or similar ones) does not provide 
information by deciles, it is not possible to work with the Palma Ratio methodology.122 
 
It is remarkable how the election of Reagan and Thatcher, and the fall of that 
infamous wall, triggered among the OECD this reverse catching up with the 
tropics, which including the ‘bananization’ of their market inequality. As is well 
known, a key Washington Consensus promise was that if the package of policies 
and structural transformations that they preached were implemented, there 
would be a process of “convergence” across the world.  That is, if everyone 
behaves, there would be a rapid process of closing the productivity gap between 
countries.  And this convergence would not only occur in income per capita terms, 
but also in institutions, in inequality, and so on. 
As the figure indicates, it seems that the Washington Consensus was right 
in that market ‘liberalisation’, globalization and financialisation would lead to a 
process of convergence in the distribution of market income across the world 
―but it happened in the opposite direction!  This includes, of course, financial 
corruption.123  It seems that in this neo-liberal world Germany’s famous gravity 
                                           
121  Oxfam (2018).   
122  For a short animation of the Palma Ratio, see http://uncounted.org/palma/ 
123  Deutsche Bank, Germany’s largest lender, for example, was not only heavily involved 
in Danske’s suspected €200bn money-laundering scandal, the world’s biggest, but also 
conducted correspondent transactions of about US$600bn with the Cyprus-based FBME, 
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seems to have evaporated…  Perhaps Schopenhauer’s pessimism was more 
visionary than usually acknowledged.  
This ‘upside-down catching-up’ of the high-income OECD countries with 
highly unequal middle-income countries is one of the most characteristic stylised 
facts in Western economies since the neo-liberal reforms of the 1980s ―and the 
least studied.124  Basically, this so-called ‘development’ model, instead of 
encouraging Latin America to "Europeanise", has led the high-income OECD to 
"bananise" ―with QE providing a helping hand.   
In the introduction to one of his best-known works, Marx claimed that the 
most developed countries would show the most backward "the image of their 
future."  For him, but for different reasons, the convergence would also be of the 
kind predicted by the Washington Consensus. If it ever was like this, it is not 
anymore.  Now we are all indeed converging in this neo-liberal era, but towards 
features characteristic of some highly unequal middle-income countries such as 
mobile élites creaming off the rewards of economic growth (as they claim 
property rights over all of them in a new winner-takes-all scenario), and ‘magic 
realist’ politics that lack self-respect if not originality.   
 So, now we see countries in Europe and the US (with Japan not far 
behind) with a distribution of market income characteristic of a country on the 
other side of the Rio Grande; in fact, in this metric the US is already more 
unequal than Mexico (Ginis of 50.8 and 46.6, respectively);125 and with a 
president who only lacks dark glasses to look like a little Mussolini from a banana 
republic.  In fact, if the US had the same level of national income as now, but the 
level of inequality as when Reagan was elected, the top 1% would today be 
earning about US$2tn less than it actually does ― a figure larger than Brazil’s 
GDP.  In the meantime, average hourly real earnings have been stagnant since 
then.126  No wonder that Pope Francis called ‘unfettered free markets’ the “dung 
of the devil”.127 
Indeed, life in high-income OECD countries is now not as easy as their 
income per-capita might suggest, as one has not only a family but also a 
plutocracy to support. It is now even tempting to say “Welcome to the Third 
World”.   
 
5.- The role of large Institutional Investors  
The remarkable increase in the concentration of the asset management industry 
was a key factor in the intensity of the asset-price inflation and the recurrent 
bouts of panics discussed above.  According to Ben-David et al. (2020),  
…[increased] ownership by large institutions is associated with higher stock price 
volatility, autocorrelation in returns (a measure of price inefficiency), and a 
                                                                                                                         
one of the world’s most corrupt banks (https://www.asiasentinel.com/p/deutsche-bank-
pays-price-for-deep).  It was also involved in a “mirror trading scheme”, which laundered 
billions out of Russia. And (as mentioned above) according to the “FINCEN files”, Deutsche 
Bank was one of the main banks that helped oligarchs, criminals and terrorists move 
billions of illicit cash (FinCEN, 2020). See also https://www.ft.com/content/ac9295c9-
b391-4e00-a367-0602bafc4dc2.  
124  For an analysis of this issue, see Palma (2019a and b), and Palma (2020b). 
125  SWIID (2020).  
126  https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/08/07/for-most-us-workers-real-wages-
have-barely-budged-for-decades/ 
127  Quoted in https://www.ft.com/content/645ab1f0-59fb-11e8-b8b2-d6ceb45fa9d0.   
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greater magnitude of price drops at times of market stress (a measure of price 
fragility).128   
And then they add,  
…empirical evidence [shows] that ownership by large institutions predicts higher 
volatility and greater noise in stock prices as well as greater fragility in times of 
crisis.  
This is why the fact that the 10 largest institutional investors now collectively own 
more than a quarter of the US stock market is so relevant.  Concentration of 
ownership at this scale has pushed up the volatility of stocks held in their 
portfolios and added to the mispricings now embedded in shares.  So, it is 
difficult to understand why US governments since Clinton (and Summers) have 
refused to classify them alongside big banks as “systemically important” financial 
institutions.   
 While smaller fund managers trade against each other, which help to 
cancel out their impact, large institutions tend to trade massively in just one 
direction (Ibid.).  Their impact on stock prices, therefore, is much larger than a 
collection of small institutions managing the same amount of assets.  In fact, 
after examining regulatory filings between 1980 and 2016 the above study 
concludes that stocks with higher ownership by big institutional investors also 
registered larger price falls in periods of market turmoil as they engage in 
massive sales that depress stock prices.  In other words,  
The correlated behaviour of big conglomerates, combined with the sheer size, has 
repercussions on asset price stability that are mostly felt during times of market 
stress.  
Therefore, excessive concentration in the asset management industry poses a 
systemic risk ―but so far (captured) regulators and politicians turn a blind eye.  
 The usual counterargument is about large ‘economies of scale in 
information’, with large institutions passing on additional gains to their clients.  
However, as the larger the concentration in asset management, the larger the 
likely difference between the average and the marginal return in financial 
markets, there is a vicious circle of concentration; and the larger the 
concentration, the lower the necessity to pass on these gains to clients.  
The real issue for regulators is how to balance the likelihood of increased 
profits by larger firms and clients with the costs of a larger systemic risk ―i.e., of 
higher price volatility, market inefficiency and fragility; and with the increased 
power of larger firms to capture policy.  I would argue that what comes first in 
this conundrum is a no-brainer, as the lethal cocktail of market concentration 
with emasculated regulators helps financialisation becoming a crude form of 
market distortion.  And as these distortions aim at stopping the law of gravity 
from working in finance, counterbalances such as diminishing returns never set in 
―so, the more the quantity of finance, the higher the returns.  And free-market 
fundamentalists become cheerleaders of market distortions…   
 
6.- When emerging markets become ‘the wrong place’  
The main force behind current financial fragilities in emerging markets is the 
inevitable repercussions of the unprecedented surge of financial flows from the 
North. QE is not only distorting the underlying performance of advanced 
economies, but is also driving a tsunami of hot-money flows to the higher-yields 
South.  
                                           
128  Ben-David et al. (2020).  
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According to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), just in the first 
five years of QE about US$7tn of those funds flooded emerging markets129 
―often after being leveraged into many multiples of their original value.130  And 
this has lifted overall credit provided overseas in US dollars through bank loans 
and bonds by the staggering amount of nearly US$10tn.131  In fact, and also 
according to BIS data, at end of 2019 non-financial corporations in 16 emerging 
economies had outstanding debts of US$29tn, up from less than US$11tn ten 
years before ―and this was not just a China phenomenon, as this debt had also 
grown by 61% in the other 15 countries.132  In Chile, for example, the foreign 
currency component of overall debt by non-financial corporations reached one-
third of GDP, in Turkey nearly 30% and in Mexico 21%.  And in dollar terms, in 
2019 it had reached well over US200bn in Brazil and in Mexico, and about 
US$100bn in Chile.   
In Chile most of these funds were used to finance capital flight in the form 
of shifting new productive capacities to neighbouring countries.  So the assets 
emerged abroad while the passives were kept at home, with policy-makers 
cheering on…  Given that the purely extractive model has been long exhausted at 
home, big corporations faced a clear choice: to take on the challenge of an 
upwards diversification of their extractive model, or to keep doing more of the 
same in the form of horizontal diversification in neighbouring countries.  That is, 
either upgrade the extractive model to the industrialisation of commodities, 
towards a green new deal, and so on, or keep doing more of the same simple 
extractive and service activities somewhere else.133  No prizes for guessing what 
their choice was in a country plagued by neo-phobia.134    
The irony of this tsunami of funds towards the South is that it was fuelled 
by funds released by the FED, followed later by the Bank of England, the 
European Central Bank and the Bank of Japan to help reduce their systemic risks, 
and to reactivate their domestic economies.  But as the President of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Dallas reminds us (quoted as epigraph), instead, QE was 
stubbornly going its own way: 
In my darkest moments I have begun to wonder if the monetary accommodation 
we have already engineered might …be working in the wrong places. Far too many 
of the large corporations I survey …report that the most effective way to deploy 
cheap money raised in the current bond markets or in the form of loans from 
banks, beyond buying in stock or expanding dividends, is to invest it abroad …135  
I would argue (and not just because I come from one of those ‘wrong places’), 
that this QE-led flood of liquidity has shown all that is wrong with the current 
process of financialisation: instead of helping opening up much needed new 
productive opportunities, it has fuelled the ‘anything but productive 
diversification’ bubble in places such as Latin America and South Africa (Africa’s 
honorary Latin-American country).  Thus, while capital flight, M&A, stock-prices 
                                           
129  http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/46f42c36-8965-11e5-90de-
f44762bf9896.html#axzz3rjS3sytj  
130  See, for example, Lavigne et al. (2014); and McCauley et al. (2015).  
131  Avdjiev et al. (2015); McCauley et al. (2015). 
132  Avdjiev, S et al. (2020).  
133  On how to industrializing around natural resources, see Perez (2015).  
134  On this “fear-of-the-new”, see 
https://www.ineteconomics.org/perspectives/blog/chiles-outburst-of-discontent 
135  http://www.dallasfed.org/news/speeches/fisher/2010/fs101007.cfm 
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and any other conceivable financial assets were thriving, in the real economy only 
more of the same residential construction and commodity extraction benefited.136  
There were several routes by which QE did its ‘reverse emigration’ to the 
South; one involved the FED buying US Treasury bonds from financial 
corporations such as pension funds, institutions that hold them as long-term 
assets with low but dependable yields.  By doing this, the FED raised bond prices 
and lowered yields, sending restless asset managers to the South in search of 
higher yields.  Another was that QE-liquidity also found its way to funds that use 
their leverage capabilities to increase the (often highly destabilising) ability of 
speculators to navigate shifting emerging markets with bull and bear flexibility.  
Also, funds with highly leveraged cash would seek high returns by scalping 
emerging markets with activities such as the carry trade137 ―and as instruments 
such as credit cards in places as Brazil have reached an average interest rate of 
240% p.a. (up to 490% p.a. at HSBC), returns are astronomical.138  All this, of 
course, could only remain one-way bets if exchange rates in emerging markets 
and other ‘automatic destabilisers’ acquiesce.  
That is, when international financial markets found themselves with excess 
liquidity and shortage of solid and performing financial assets, they rediscovered 
developing countries and transformed them in their “market of last resort”, while 
also making commodities their “financial assets of last resort”.139  It may not be 
the first time that this has happened, but the South ain't seen nothing like this 
before.   
This phenomenon is like international finance being forced (by excess 
liquidity) to switch from “redlining” emerging markets to “reverse redlining” 
them; that is, having to switch finance from being a “sellers markets” that treats 
the South with some contempt, to being forced to target them affably (“buyers” 
markets”).140   
In terms of domestic absorption, Central Banks in developing countries, by 
taking these foreign assets on to their balance sheets, also had to create liabilities. 
So they printed money, and sometimes sold bonds to sterilise. But when fresh 
cash made its way into the local banking system, they could then lend more — 
actually, they could lend multiples of those amounts (about four times in Brazil, 
eight times in Malaysia and 10 times in Chile).141 
Also, foreign direct investment was another route for QE to find its way 
into emerging markets; with often up to half of it being just intra-company 
loans.142  In Asia, as opposed to Latin America and South Africa, some of this did 
end up helping to increase productive capacities, but inevitably some just added 
liquidity to China’s shady shadow banking as well.  In the case of Latin America, 
the QE-related surge of FDI seems to have as little impact on investment as 
possible.143  (Figure 11). 
                                           
136  On the political economy impact of the pandemic in the ‘wrong places’, see Palma 
(2020b).  
137  Borrowing in currencies where interest rates are low and placing the proceeds where 
they are high.  
138  https://www.ft.com/content/6de7d288-d745-3325-9cee-bbd7bf6d4d20 
139  Palma (2016). 
140  In the US ‘redlining’ is used to refer to the systematic denial of various services to 
neighbourhoods with high proportion of minority groups.  
141  Palma (2009).  
142  Avdjiev et al. (2014).  




● a=Brady Bonds and beginning of financial liberalisation; and b=beginning of QE. 
● Source: ECLAC (2020). 
 
Despite FDI inflows since the 1989 ‘Brady Bonds’ of no less than US$3.6tn 
(US$2.2 since the beginning of QE), Latin America’s investment rates remained 
unmoved at their low historical rates.144  Part of the problem, of course, is the 
nature of that FDI: researchers at the IMF and the University of Copenhagen have 
shown that the purpose of a large share of FDI is simply to minimise 
multinationals’ global tax bill, ending up in empty corporate shells with no real 
business activities in the host nation.  As the report concludes, “Globally, 
phantom investments amount to an astonishing $15 trillion, or the combined 
annual GDP of economic powerhouses China and Germany”.145  That is, almost 
40% of global FDI is phantom, with their contribution to the local economy 
limited to buying tax advisory, accounting and other financial services ―as well 
as that for keeping politicians sweet.   
 In fact, in ‘FDI intensive’ Brazil and Mexico investment per worker has 
been below its 1980 level ever since; the same is true for most countries of the 
region.146  Meanwhile, in emerging Asia, Korea increased this statistic by a factor 
of 5, India’s by 8 and China’s by more than 20 (and according to some sources by 
nearly 30) ―perhaps one can have too much of a good thing!  
With such poor investment performance it is no surprise that according to 
the economic complexity index (ECI), some Latin American countries ―given 
                                           
144  Palma (2010).  
145  IMF (2019). 
146  Palma (2019b).  
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their levels of income per capita―, are some of the least diversified economies in 
the World (and none worse than Chile).147  
While in Latin America investment has struggled to reach even 20% of 
GDP since the neo-liberal reforms ―less than half China’s levels― its GDP-share 
of household consumption is currently twice that of China.  Needless to say, both 
China and Latin America now urgently need to rebalance their growth, but in 
opposite directions!   
Although these huge FDI inflows, as well as foreign bank loans and 
portfolio inflows may have had a negligible positive impact on investment rates, 
they did certainly have, however, a major negative one on the current account of 
the balance of payments (Figure 12).  Taking into account only those associated 
with FDI since 2002, when commodity prices began their meteoric rise, nearly 
US$2tn has left the region in the form of profit repatriation (with those of 
portfolio and “other investment” reaching almost US$1.5tn).   
FIGURE 12 
 
● a=Brady Bonds and beginning of financial liberalisation in most countries of the 
region; and b=beginning of QE. 
● Source: ECLAC (2020).  
 
In the case of Chile, for example, profit repatriation by FDI between 2002 and 
2014 alone was larger than the stock of the entire retirement account savings of 
all Chilean workers (more than 10 million people), those who have no choice but 
be affiliated to the (draconian) private pension fund system (AFPs)148 —about 
US$190 billion versus about US$160 billion, respectively.  The former is also 
larger than the whole of the Marshall Plan!  And just in terms of what Sturla et al. 
                                           




call “gratuitous rents”, the figure for just 10 copper multinationals reaches 
US$120bn between 2005 and 2015149 ―with no royalties paid for those rents, as 
the one in existence is just a farce.150  
And all that for the great inconvenience of exporting copper concentrates 
—a mud with a metal content of about only 30%, which is the result of a 
rudimentary flotation of the pulverized raw copper ore.  All this gives a whole new 
meaning to the concept of ‘picking just the low-hanging fruit’ ―and to gratuitous 
environmental damage.151  
And, in turn, huge volatilities portfolio inflows brought in an extra degree 
of macroeconomic uncertainty. See Figure 13. 
FIGURE 13 
 
● a=Brady Bonds; and b=beginning of QE. 
● Source: ECLAC (2020).  
 
These pretty much socially useless and destabilising inflows not only reached 
US$1.8tn since the Brady bonds (over US$1tn since QE), but they also had a 
coefficient of variation of 0.86 per year!  For monetary authorities this was 
macroeconomic instability on steroids, and domestic and pandemic-related shocks 
did not help either.  But as they think that their main aim in life is to keep 
speculators sweet, they threw in the towel and left exchange rate at the mercy of 
the storm.  (Figure 14). 
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151  Over a thousand cargo ships sail each year from Chile with concentrates; but as this 
only have about 30% of the mineral, more than 700 (equivalent) ones sail with just slag 





● Source: Banco Central de Chile (2020).  
 
No need to restate here the huge negative impact of this exchange rate instability 
on investment and economic diversification.  
In sum, emerging markets as a whole already owe a total of US$71tn;152 
and their non-financial corporates’ debt (at nearly 100% of GDP) is greater than 
in developed markets in the build-up to the 2008 financial crisis.  In fact, as many 
of the commodity producing economies simply assumed that the commodity-price 
boom would last forever (‘this time it’s different’), they adjusted their permanent 
income expectations accordingly.153  As a result, they mortgaged their expected 
higher income streams by embarking on domestic credit and consumption booms 
that have left many of these countries with serious debt hangovers and rusty 
productive capacities.  According to the IIF, pre-pandemic overall emerging 
market debt reached 220% of GDP in 2019 ―and in mature (geriatric?) 
economies, debt-to-GDP reached 380%, with global debt soaring to a record high 
of US$258 tn at the time of the outbreak of the pandemic in 2020.154  It is 
difficult even to imagine what this figure will be after the pandemics.  
From this perspective, the paradox is that QE was designed to help reduce 
systemic risks in mature economies, not to make possible the build up of a huge 
debt-bubble in emerging markets in both cross-border lending and in bank 
lending, with the former now at serious risk of currency mismatches, and the 
latter one of liquidity mismatches.  Accordingly, a credit crunch could mean a 
                                           
152  https://www.ft.com/content/f7157356-e773-47c4-b05d-8624a5ccfd03 
153  In Chile, consumption jumped from 65% of GDP in 2006 to 76% in 2014 (at the end of 
the commodities’ “super-cycle”), only to increase again to 78% in 2017 (Banco Central de 
Chile, 2020).  In this kind of scenario, a consumption binge can easily be mistaken for 
prosperity. 
154  IIF (2020). 
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corporate dollar-debt crisis due to the former, or a domestic banking one due to 
the latter.  
In actual fact, pandemic apart, we should not expect a demand-led 
recovery in Latin America or South Africa unless a robust set of linkages between 
financial markets and the real economy is re-established (à la FDR). As Keynes 
(1930) said at the time of the 1930s crash: 
…there cannot be a real recovery, in my judgment, until the idea of lenders and 
the idea of productive borrowers are brought together again… . 
But try to get speculators, traders and rentiers ―or politicians in need of 
campaign financing for that matter― to understand, when their earnings, 
bonuses, share options and corporate-sponsored retirement plans depend on 
their not understanding it.  
This is the fundamental problem with the current neo-liberal model: there 
are not many ways to reshape the structure of a ‘system’ with so little entropy 
(as it were), as there are few ways in which one can redesign its structure (so 
that it can move ‘forward’ in time), if one can’t change its fundamentals: that 
those at the top continue to appropriate such an absurd share of national income 
and wealth, engaging in the same low hanging fruit type of activities.  Hence, its 
structural rigidity.  
The stakes for emerging markets’ corporations, their real economies and 
financial markets, and wider society could scarcely be higher, and these 
challenges are happening at the worst possible time, as our social imagination 
has seldom been so barren.  Add the pandemic to this, and (quoting the great 
poet Camões on the Portuguese sailors of the 1500s) surely we are now “em 
mares nunca dantes navegados” (on hitherto unsailed seas).  
 
Conclusions 
When Charles Kindleberger gave me a copy of his famous book, he wrote on the 
first page ―and in big letters― “Avoid manias”!  If one adds to this Keynes’ key 
policy recommendation in this area, “Let finance by primarily national”,155 and 
also the policy implications of Minsky’s (1986) proposition that “a capitalist 
economy is inherently flawed because its investment and financing processes 
introduce endogenous destabilizing forces”, the key message emerging from the 
events analysed in this paper becomes clear: if you do the opposite, as still 
preached by recalcitrant neo-liberal zealots and by the lobby of powerful especial 
interest groups, and as practised by uninspired ‘new alchemists’ and frantic 
speculators (who know the price of everything but the value of nothing), then 
(paraphrasing a FT columnist) finance becomes “science fiction”, a it’s-not-
meant-to-make-sense “gigantic global joke”.  
Perhaps (just perhaps) it is finally becoming ‘common sense’ (from a 
Gramscian perspective)156 that the ever-increasing financialisation, which has 
characterized the global landscape since Reagan and Thatcher, has been an 
entirely self-constructed and highly distorting market failure ―and a 
distributional one as well.   
If this perpetual mania were allowed to continue with its decadent frenzy, 
the damage to the real economy (and almost everything else for that matter) 
could be such that it could bear a resemblance to Cesar Vallejo’s presage: “…you 
can’t play anymore, because the Earth is already like a dice corroded and 
                                           
155  Keynes (1933). 
156  On ‘common sense’, see Gramsci (1987). 
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rounded from rolling without restraint; and now it can end up only in a hollow 
place, in the hollow of a deadly void”.157  
Theodore Roosevelt (1913) was surely right when he stated that “Of all 































                                           
157  From the poem “Los Dados Eternos”; my translation.   
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